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In this paper we argue that there are at least two conditions for the adequate realization of the capacity of free will – 
and thus of the realization of the right to freedom of education – that are missing from Matusov's account, and needed 
to be integrated with it in order to enable the successful implementation of the right to freedom of education principle. 
We will then offer a different typology of the field of education, a typology that is complementary, rather than 
contradictory, to Matusov's typology, and use this typology – especially the concept of heutagogy – to offer a way that 
optimizes freedom of will in education. 
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One of the main aspects of the subject of freedom is that of free will. The free will theme is one of 
the core themes of Western philosophy and keeps haunting it for many centuries.  However, the debates 
concerning free will tend to be very abstract, and mostly deal with its metaphysical and logical conditions 
(as well as their consequences to the concepts of moral responsibility). In this paper we will focus on the 
more practical aspect of free will, that is, its execution in real-life situations, and we will assume that free 
will do exist, since it seems to us that free will is both a logical condition of the freedom of education thesis 
and presupposed by Matusov (2020) when dealing with this thesis. 
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Assuming that humans are endowed with the capacity of free will, and that this capacity is a 
necessary condition for the realization of the right to freedom of education, a question arises: Does the 
priority that Matusov gives to the principle of the right to freedom of education hinders in some way the full 
realization of this capacity? For if it does, it follows that this very right is being damaged.  
In what follows, we will argue that there are at least two conditions for the adequate realization of 
the capacity of free will – and thus of the realization of the right to freedom of education – that are missing 
from Matusov's account, and needed to be integrated with it in order to enable the successful 
implementation of the right to freedom of education principle. We will then offer a different typology of the 
field of education, a typology that is complementary, rather than contradictory, to Matusov's typology, and 
use this typology – especially the concept of heutagogy – to offer a way that optimizes freedom of will in 
education. 
Two views of free will 
Beside views that deny the possibility of free will, and will not be dealt with here, there are two basic 
philosophical positions which suppose, and argue for its existence. These positions are compatibilism and 
libertarianism. The main difference between compatibilism and libertarianism is that the former holds that 
there is no contradiction between the concepts of determinism and free will, while the latter holds that for 
free will to be possible, indeterminism must be true. Thus, central to the libertarian views on free will is the 
principle of alternative possibilities (e.g., Ginet, 1996; Kane, 1996, 2005), which states that for every free 
action, there must be at least two possible actions that the agent can chose from, while compatibilists deny 
the necessity of this condition.  
Of course, there is much more to be said about the compatibilism-libertarianism debate, but this 
cannot be done here due to space limitation. It is important to notice, however, that both views agree that 
some conditions, such as external coercion or manipulation, and agent's ignorance, would hamper free will 
(Berofsky, 2009; Kane, 2005; Pereboom, 2014), and also, that in order for an action to be considered free, 
the agent must be, in some sense, the author, or the source of this action.  
In his paper, Matusov does not explicate his position regarding free will. Nevertheless, it seems to 
us that he emphasizes the concept of choice (Matusov, 2020, pp. SF3, SF6, SF10, SF11, SF19, SF22), 
and hence his free will view is close to the libertarian view. Therefore, in what follows, we will assume this 
view, but most of our arguments can be adopted (with slight modifications) as to encompass the 
compatibilist view as well. 
The argument from thinking skills 
Suppose that John studies in a university. Before the beginning of the semester, he reads a syllabus 
of a course entitled "critical examination," and, impressed by its rational, he decides to take the course.  
Heading toward the class for the course's first lesson, he meets another student – Emily. They discuss the 
course syllabus and Emily claims that while the syllabus is well-constructed, John should not believe 
everything written in it because obviously, the professor who wrote the syllabus has an interest in promoting 
it and attract students, and furthermore, she never heard any student saying something positive about this 
course, "So it must be a poor course." Convinced by her claims, John decides to give up the course and 
take another one instead.  
Was John decision a free decision, and was he executing is right to freedom of education? Many 
would notice that John's change of mind was a result of erroneous reasoning, since Emily's argument is 
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based on two logical fallacies – the circumstantial ad hominem and the argument from ignorance. However, 
some may feel reluctant to conclude that that fact alone is sufficient to establish that John's decision and 
the action that followed it were not free. After all, it seems that he could have decided otherwise, he was 
not forced to take this course of action, so cannot his decision be considered a free decision?  
But what we would have thought if we knew that Emily's conversation with John was a premeditated 
attempt to manipulate him and cause him to leave the course (maybe she had a quarrel with the course's 
professor and looked for revenge)? Many philosophers have given examples of external manipulation, 
showing that people who are being manipulated to think, decide or act on the manipulator will cannot be 
considered free agents. These examples may be classified according to the strength of the manipulation – 
from neuroscientists who can manipulate human's brain states (Pereboom, 2014) to social engineers who 
manipulate people behavior (Kane, 2005), to governments indoctrination, and so forth. The point is, that 
both common people intuitions, as exemplified in the law system (e.g., Murray & Lombrozo, 2017), and 
philosophical considerations, lead to the conclusion that manipulated person is un-free, or at least less free 
– if the manipulation is understood as less forceful. The philosophical arguments for the impediment of free 
will in case of manipulation may vary according the philosophical orientation of the arguer. Thus, for 
compatibilists, the manipulee is less free because her manipulated act is less authentic, not expressing her 
deep self (Shoemaker, 2015), while for the libertarian, the loss of freedom is the outcome of the loss, or 
narrowing, of the range of possibilities, or, on other accounts, the loss of the ultimate authorship of the 
manipulee, who is no longer the source of her act (Kane, 1996, 2005). In our example, John initial decision 
to take the course was his own, and if we think of Emily's move as a premeditated manipulative move, we 
will probably be more inclined to accept that John's decision was not free because he could not be 
considered the author or source of it.  
However, the most important point to be noticed is that John change of mind was due to an 
erroneous reasoning. This has nothing to do with any objective state of affairs in the outside world – 
because neither John nor Emily, or, for that matter, anybody else, could knew (based on Emily's argument) 
whether taking the course was good for John or not. It was wrong judgment, which is the outcome of poor 
reasoning, and this poor reasoning, whether it was caused by intentional manipulation or not – brought 
John to take a course of action that otherwise he would have not taken, and thus damaged his ability to 
choose what is good for him.   
Thus, it seems that basic thinking skill, or, more precisely, basic critical thinking skills, are needed 
for students, and persons generally, in order to make choices that are both more suitable for them, and, in 
a broader sense, freer. These skills might be less needed for villagers who live simple life in remote places, 
but in our modern societies, with the mass media, fake news, aggressive advertising, and strong and 
manipulative political and economic powers, it seems as a necessary condition for the actualization of free 
will. Moreover, even beyond the ever-present tangible possibility of manipulation, it should be noted that 
cases like the above case has nothing to do with the agent's right to act foolishly, irrationally, and so forth, 
since the action taken by John was a result of ignorance, and not of his (free) will to act as he wishes. At 
the bottom line, this means that without the ability for "reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused on 
deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1985, p. 45), people will be less free, and students' right to freedom 
of education will be impaired.     
Lastly, it is important to point out that the demand for basic critical thinking skills is far more modest 
and less pretentious than the Kantian ambitious portrayal of an all-embracing, truth-discoverer and moral-
discoverer reason. There is no need to assume, and indeed most critical thinking scholars will not assume, 
that reason discloses the absolute truth or the absolute moral principle(s). Rather, reason, or rationality, as 
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the ability to weigh reasons (Paul, 1993; Siegel, 1988), helps us to avoid mistakes and wrong judgements, 
to better understand ourselves and the world, without necessarily supposing neither that it can reveal the 
ultimate truth nor that it is the only guide for action. 
The argument from lack of content 
Let us imagine, for example, a student who studies to become a teacher in a teacher education 
institution. She studies in a program which adopts the guidelines of the principle of the right to freedom of 
education, and thus, among other things, gets "to decide what to learn" (Matusov, 2020, p. SF10). After 
visiting few schools and learning their educational practices, she decides that she wishes to focus her entire 
learning on the prevailing practices she has seen in these schools, which – she rightly supposes – are the 
common practices of the entire educational system (she might reason that both her future student and 
herself would benefit from her becoming an expert in the established way of teaching).  
Now, it seems to us that this student's freedom of choice, and thus her ability to act freely, is being 
damaged, rather than broadened, because she is not aware of other educational options, such as, if we 
adopt Matusov (2020) terminology, the practices of close and open socialization and of education as critical 
examination. Yes, she might acquire knowledge of these other practices from "her interaction with the 
teacher, peers, other people, texts, experiences, observations, activities…" (Matusov, 2020, p. SF11), but 
she also might not, especially if she is inclined to stick with her initial decision. To put it more generally, in 
order to exercise free will, an agent needs possibilities, and the less possibilities there are, the less 
possibilities the agent is aware of, the lesser is her freedom, and vice versa – the more possibilities the 
agent has, the more possibilities the agent is aware of, the freer she is. In our present context, a student 
who is not aware of, and even more – does not have basic understanding of – the major trends in the 
discipline or subject she wishes to study, cannot really execute her right to freedom of education, either 
because she hardly has option to choose from, or because her choice is a mere guess.  
Pedagogy, andragogy and heutagogy (PAH) 
Following the above discussion about freedom of will as a precondition for freedom of education, 
and referring to Matusov (2020) differentiation between "training, close socialization, open socialization, 
and critical examination, along with the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy" (p. SF3), we would like to present a 
complementary conceptual frame which  expresses the different levels of learners' freedom of education, 
by identifying three major educational paradigms: pedagogy, andragogy and heutagogy (PAH). 
Pedagogy assumes that the “learner is, by definition a dependent one” (Knowles, 1980, p. 43). The 
teacher takes full responsibility of determining what, when, and how something is to be learned, and to 
evaluate it. In pedagogy, the freedom of education is very limited. In pedagogy, "what is to be learnt, and 
how, is both determined and directed by the teacher; in andragogy [i.e., adult learning], it is determined by 
the teacher and directed by the learner” (Anderson, 2006, cited by Luckin et al., 2010). Pedagogy and 
andragogy differ from heutagogy (self-determined learning), in which “both determination and direction shift 
to the learner” (Luckin et al., 2010). Heutagogy enables the students to experience high level of freedom of 
education. Knowles (1970) defines self-determined learning as “…the process in which individuals take the 
initiative…in diagnosing their learning needs, formulating learning goals, identifying resources for learning, 
choosing and implementing learning strategies, and evaluating learning outcomes” (p. 7).  
Using our and others' experiences in teaching heutagogy courses, we believe that we do not have 
to wait until the "intrinsic education occurs when our civilization transitions from the exclusively necessity-
based to a leisure-dominated hybrid" (Matusov, p. SF23). Implementation of heutagogy enhances such 
Free Will and Heutagogy  





Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2020.347  |  Vol. 8 (2020) 
 
SF84 
education in schools and in higher education (see Blaschke, Kenyon & Hase, 2014; Glassner & Back, 
2020). In the next section we expand on the characteristics of heutagogy, and its dialectical relations with 
the concept of free will and the issues of critical thinking skills and lack of content. 
Heutagogy: to implement freedom of education 
Heutagogy (Hase & Kenyon, 2000) is a student-centered learning-teaching approach in which the 
learners, facilitated by a mentor/teacher, determine their own learning. They individually decide what, how, 
with whom, when, and in which environment to learn. They also choose how to evaluate their learning and 
its outcomes and how to present the knowledge they had created about the topic they have learned and 
about themselves as learners (Glassner & Back, 2020).   
According to the connectivism theory (Simense, 2008), heutagogy presupposes that knowledge 
(tying connections) in its nature is usually organized as a mesh network (each node is connected to the 
others nodes), in addition to other traditional networks such as a ring (circle), tree (roots and brunches 
algorithm) and bus-line (linear) (Glassner & Back, 2020).  
Following this presupposition, we suggest that heutagogy learning is characterized by learners' 
wandering in mesh network and by handling symmetric dialogue (without authority) with their teachers. The 
learning is for its own sake, although it might have instrumental ends (Glassner & Back, 2020). In addition, 
the ethical aspect of learning should promote freedom, democracy, and tolerance toward others.  
Referring to Matusov (2020, p. SF10-SF11) elements of freedom of education, heutagogy enables 
the student's freedom to choose the curriculum, instruction, participation, valuation, ecology and leisure. 
One can argue, though, that in heutagogy students are limited in their freedom to choose their role and 
paradigm, as they are expected to be self-determined learners. 
We cannot and should not force students to participate in heutagogy learning, but we can invite 
them to experience it by facilitating their self-determined learning. The lecturer/teacher has to fully trust her 
students' capability to be self-determined learners (Glassner &Back, 2020). In addition, when students 
choose to learn in groups it might help some of them to feel more comfortable and secure. However, working 
in groups can discourage the individual from being self-determined.  
In order to cope with the obstacles of freedom of will mentioned above (lack of content that limits 
more freely choosing and lack of critical thinking skills), we take some practical steps in our version of 
heutagogy courses. 
Fostering curiosity to learn and expanding choices for learning: This is a preliminary stage to the 
self-determined learning, in which, we, the lecturers, expose the central ideas, issues and questions of the 
course’s general subject. Such exposure enables the students to develop their own ideas about what they 
wish to learn in the course. Although this preliminary stage represents more pedagogy than heutagogy, it 
enables the students to increase their freedom of will and education by expanding their choices to identify 
what they wish to learn in the course (Glassner & Back, 2020).   
Enhancing a dialogical critical thinking environment: In our heutagogy courses, the students are 
invited to initiate genuine dialogues with us and among themselves, using different communication ways 
and tools they choose (e.g., face to face meetings or remoted correspondence like e-mails). In these 
dialogues they are invited to discuss their learning aims, desires, believes, blokes, challenges and 
difficulties. The students are encouraged to reflect upon their decisions, attitudes and preferences, and try 
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to understand their origins and how they can justify them. In this way they develop their critical thinking, 
unpack their deep personality, and discover their authentic identity (Glassner & Back, 2020). 
Conclusion 
There is no absolute freedom, rather, there are different levels of freedom, and in order to get closer 
to the higher levels of freedom, certain conditions are needed. This means that freedom is a dialectical 
concept, because necessity is interwoven within it. Content knowledge and basic critical thinking skills are 
two of the conditions needed for elevating free will, and thus the execution of the right to freedom of 
education, to those higher levels. Surely, there are more conditions (e.g., some reflective capacity), and 
further mapping and understanding them can contribute to the important subject of freedom of education. 
Here, however, we have focused on these two, trying to show both their importance, and the way heutagogy 
tries to integrate them with the aspiration for freedom of education, in a way that harms this freedom as 
less as possible. Thus, heutagogy presents an educational paradigm which acknowledges the tension that 
is built-in within the concept of freedom, a tension we should strive to soften as much as possible, without 
hoping for its complete resolution, since this tension is part and parcel of freedom itself. 
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